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Abstract. As the primary protocol used to exchange routing information
between network domains, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) plays a central role
in the functioning of the Internet. Border Gateway Protocol is a standardized
router protocol used to initiate and maintain communication between domains,
or autonomous systems, on the Internet. This protocol can exhibit anomalous
behavior caused by improper provisioning, malicious attacks, traffic or
equipment failure, and network operator error. At large internet service
providers, many BGP issues are not immediately seen or explicitly monitored
by network operations centers. This possible blind spot is due to the enormous
number of BGP handshakes that occur throughout the network along with the
fact that there are many of these sub-interfaces associated to a single physical
connection. We will present machine learning methods for anomaly detection
using unsupervised learning techniques and discuss possible data pipeline
methods to quickly collect and trigger on these anomalies when they occur.
Clustering techniques including k-means and DBSCAN were successfully
implemented and able to detect known anomalies for historical events. This
approach could incur soft savings by triggering early detection warnings of
anomalous BGP events, but human intervention may still be required in order to
address possible false positives.

1

Introduction

At large Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is
the most widely used exterior gateway routing protocol for domain peering. When
establishing these peering connections, BGP exchanges routing and reachability
information between domains or autonomous systems (AS) on the Internet. The
handshake to initiate a BGP session is a finite state machine that transitions between
six different states. The patterns to get from ‘idle’ to ‘established’ are not always the
same and even repeat over and over in some cases. The timestamp, current and
previous state, and other information related to BGP state changes are sent to router
log servers as messages where they can be collected and analyzed. These interactions
are reported as BGP neighbors periodically drop and reestablish, which makes this
data available for network alarming perspective. [1]
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Some examples of historical anomalies that affected BGP routing performance are
listed below. Some of these were selected for to apply unsupervised learning to as
they were massive scale events and easier to measure results. This project would
attempt early detection of similar type events as some of these events reoccurred or
continued to create havoc for many days as many of these were not detected and/or
categorized in a timely manner.
•
•
•
•
•
•

TTNet announced more than 100,000 incorrect routes, 24 December 2004
TMNet BGP misconfiguration, 12 June 2015
AS27506 hijacked panix domain, 14 January 2005
Dodo ISP incident, 23 February 2012
Mosco blackout hardware failure, 7 May 2005
Worm attacks such as Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I

The motivation for this project is to introduce soft savings associated with early
detection and isolation of BGP events.
•
•

•

BGP can sometimes exhibit anomalous behavior caused by improper
provisioning, malicious attacks, traffic or equipment failure, and network
operator error.
At large service providers, many BGP issues are overlooked by network
operations centers (NOC) because they are a logical sub-interface of a larger
physical interface that stays intact (critical alarming occurs only on the
physical interface).
BGP handshakes are constantly occurring so they are mostly ignored as
normal operation based on high volume vs. low actual event incidence.

It is possible to make use of BGP message logs as they are collected by applying
machine learning techniques to detect anomalous behavior that could be network
affecting. During this effort, false positives must be kept to a minimum as it is
extremely important to not overload already busy operations center with useless
information. [2]
The simple problem definition is to find BGP anomalies and report them. The
approach for this paper is to address the problem by implementing unsupervised
clustering techniques to detect anomalies and iteratively apply them to datasets of
multiple known events as a metric to measure against to determine optimal model(s)
and parameterization. Once the optimal clustering method or combination thereof is
determined along with parameterization, the next step is to implement a near real-time
data flow to apply to continuous data collection.
The process flow for model selection and parameterization is a static process based
on historical data, and a near real-time data pipeline would effectively use the selected
model and its parameters to constantly monitor BGP messages as they are collected.
Some of the process step highlights are as follows:
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Fig. 1: Process Flow Diagram

The upper box contains offline model selection and parameterization process. Once
the optimal model(s) are selected and parameterized, they are testing by applying to
historical known events. The final step is to apply model(s) to near real-time data
collected every n minutes via scripted batch process.
The flow of the upcoming sections of this document will begin with an informative
BGP primer followed by related work examples. After that, the document will step
through some of the process steps in Figure 1 as shown on the list below.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Data collection and preparation.
Model selection, parameterization, and testing.
a. Results vs. historical event data.
b. Different clustering techniques.
Near real-time data flow pipelining overview.
Conclusions.

These steps imply the implementation of a data pipeline that collects, cleans,
analyzes, and then triggers based on offline model creation applied to near real-time
BGP data. Reproducible research during initial model creation (first three steps
above) is essential to ensure production pipeline capability.
Five historical events were selected, and clustering techniques including k-means
and DBSCAN were successfully implemented and able to detect known anomalies for
these events. False positives are still an issue during known historical ‘quiet times’,
however, which would require human intervention. This approach could still incur
soft savings (customer uptime satisfaction, labor reduction, latency, etc.), by sending
a report of BGP anomaly event probabilities but is not yet capable of detecting
anomalies without any false positives.
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2

BGP Primer

BGP has a long history that goes back to early 1980s. It was developed to help
interconnected gateways to efficiently exchange routing information. These gateways
connect different networks, and these networks are independently managed by their
own administrative authorities, and they are called Autonomous System (AS). A
typical enterprise network can have one or more AS numbers. Within an
internetwork, such as an enterprise network, routers typically use Interior Routing
Protocols. These routers are under the same administrative authority. Beyond these
networks and at the border gateways, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used. An
enterprise network connects upstream to a provider network, and the provider
connects to high level providers, and now this becomes a network of networks. [3]
BGP was introduced as a truly reliable dynamic routing protocol for inter-AS
routing. It is classless and supports Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). It relies
on TCP (port 179) for maintaining the neighboring relations with peer border gateway
routers. The TCP mechanism efficiently handles activities such as handshakes,
acknowledgement, retransmission and sequencing. Each pair of peers maintain a
point-to-point session. [3]
BGP is a vector protocol like RIP, and Each BGP node obtains routes from their
downstream neighbors. It then processes and calculates its own routes. The results are
then advertised to upstream neighbors. Its calculation bases on a path vector, and one
of the path attributes is AS_PATH. The calculation is to find the shortest inter-AS
path to reach the destination.
BGP is a loop-free routing protocol. Route loops can be easily detected using
AS_PATH attribute.
In summary, BGP (version 4) is an interdomain routing protocol designed to
provide loop-free routing links between organizations. RFC1771 introduced and
discussed several new BGP features to allow the protocol to scale for internet use.
Most Internet Service Providers use BGP as their border routers standard routing
protocol. Organizations use BGP to connect to an external network such as provider
network to gain access to the Internet.
There are some unique characteristics about BGP:
• BGP peers use a point-to-point unicast connection
• BGP is an application layer protocol using TCP (port 179). Session
maintenance comes from TCP functions such as acknowledgement,
retransmission and sequencing
• BGP is a path vector protocol using autonomous systems numbers
• BGP routes uses a route attribute called AS_PATH, and list AS numbers in
sequential set
• The shortest path in the AS_PATH attribute determines the best path to the
destination
• The AS numbers on the AS_PATH helps detect any loop
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2.1

BGP Messages

BGP has the four basic message types shown in Table 1.

Table 1. BGP Messages

Type Name
OPEN
KEEPALIVE
UPDATE
NOTIFICATION

Function Overview
Sets up and establishes BGP adjacency
Ensures that BGP neighbors are still operating
Sends routing updates to peers
Indicates an error condition to a BGP neighbor

Due to data availability, this project will mainly focus on analyzing BGP update
messages. Peers use update messages to synchronize routing tables. When one peer
router has changes in its routing table, it will send an update message to inform the
other router peer. The objective of using this message is to let other networks know
about these network changes. Update message contains the feasible routes
(announced), withdrawn routes or both. It also includes Network Layer Reachability
Information (NLRI) and path attributes. Each update message only describes a single
BGP path.
2.2

Path Attributes

A path attribute is a characteristic of an advertised BGP route and is included in the
update message. It contains information about the destination such as next hop
address. Path attributes are essential in BGP route calculation. Attribute usage of
well-known mandatory indicates the attribute must be included in the BGP message
or the session is closed (with a notification error generated). The optional attributes
are passed along to other peers if transitive and simply ignored if nontransitive.
Table 2. Path Attributes

Attribute Name
ORIGIN
AS_PATH
NEXT_HOP
LOCAL_PREF
ATOMIC_AGGREGATE
AGGREGATOR
COMMUNITIES
EXTENDED COMMUNITY
MULTI_EXIT_DISC (MED)
ORIFINATOR_ID
CLUSTER_LIST

Published by SMU Scholar, 2019
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Well-known mandatory
Well-known mandatory
Well-known mandatory
Well-known mandatory
Well-known mandatory
Optional transitive
Optional transitive
Optional transitive
Optional nontransitive
Optional nontransitive
Optional nontransitive
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AS4_PATH
AS4_AGGREGATOR
Multiprotocol Reachable NLRI
Multiprotocol Unreachable NLRI

Optional transitive
Optional transitive
Optional transitive
Optional transitive

Optional transitive – If the attribute is not recognized by the BGP implementation but
the transitive flag is set the attribute should be accepted and passed along to other
peers.
Optional non-transitive – If the attribute is not recognized by the BGP implementation
but the transitive flag is not set the attribute should be ignored and not passed on to
other peers.
2.3

BGP Session Establishment

There are two phases of BGP session establishment: TCP connection establishment
phase and BGP session establishment phase. TCP connection must be established for
BGP. This is called three-way handshake. The session is initially in Idle state. With
TCP connection established, the session state changes to connect. After that, BGP
enters OpenSent, OpenConfirm and Established states.[4][5]

Fig. 2. BGP Session Establishment [5]
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3

Related Work

Security is a critical requirement when organizations connect their network to the
Internet. However, BGP has many well-known security vulnerabilities. It is a protocol
that multiple independent organizations use to exchange routes in the public
internetwork. These organizations typically belong to different management domains
or Autonomous Systems. When there are security vulnerabilities, the malicious actors
will try to exploit for their benefits.
Some of vulnerabilities are inherent to the basic BGP architecture and framework.
The BGP protocol does not require strict integrity check and it does not enforce strict
authentication of the handshake messages. Most of the update message does not need
to authorize the senders.
Malicious actors can purposely inject bad routes via crafted BGP messages to
cause damage to the organization outbound traffic. Peers exchange prefixes with the
best routes, and they are locally defined. The BGP route selection process and
algorithm lack the proper security mechanism to detect and reject bad routes that sent
from a bad neighbor.
BGP works when the peering gateway routers operate in the correct operation
model. When the operation is disrupted by a successful attack, the routing process can
be degraded. Routers can be overwhelmed with routing messages. CPU and Memory
resources can be exhausted. The correct operation depends on the integrity,
authenticity and timeliness of the routing information BGP peers send. BGP routers
are required to process, store and distribute this information in accordance with both
the BGP specification and local routing policies.
Detecting a security issue is difficult. There are many limitations to the ability of
any practical security mechanism to monitor all BGP messages. Any external
observer cannot easily determine if a neighboring router is operating BGP in the
proper way. This is because monitoring such behaviors of a neighbor is beyond its
local management or local AS. One example of the security issues is that BGP does
not require sequence numbers. A bad router can send an UPDATE based on authentic
but outdated information. [6]
Some of the security issues can be un-intentional by a malfunctioning router or a
bad configuration. A router advertising the wrong route to a prefix can damage or
blackhole another organization network traffic. There are many incidents reported in
the past about Internet meltdowns resulting in widespread loss of use for several days
in some cases.
The challenge is big, and the industry has been looking for effective solutions.
There are many ongoing researches to secure BGP. BGP events can be collected and
analyzed. BGP behavior can be observed, and good and normal behaviors are
baselined. Abnormal behaviors can be detected, and the bad traffic can be rejected to
stop causing more damages to the Internet.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published a set of
security guidelines and recommendations to help organization to secure BGP. Access
list Control, peer authentication, and prefix limits are some of the methods that have
been recommended. To be more proactive in finding the threats, researchers are
looking for more effective way to identify bad behavior before any harm has been
done. [7] NIST provides a guidance for the evaluation of BGP anomaly detection.
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Researchers have been using different techniques to detect any abnormal BGP
behavior. They baseline the normal pattern and identify signatures of anomalies.
Wavelet analysis is one of the techniques that can reveal the time-frequency behavior.
The researchers take advantage of the strength of wavelet analysis in handling signal
with scaling property and its ability to detect network anomaly and identify network
wide anomalous events. Their method can detect network-wide events such as
message volume surges caused by slammer worm attack [8].
Other researchers are studying the hierarchy of abnormal BGP Events. They want
to classify the abnormal BGP events based on a hierarchy discovered by clustering
method. They apply data mining techniques to build a tree-like hierarchy of abnormal
BGP event classes [9].

4

Dataset

The source data for this project will be collected from the Réseaux IP Européens
Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) which stores public Internet routing data
through the Routing Information Service (RIS). This data is made available for
researchers without restrictions. This routing data is collected from approximately two
dozen (exact count varies over time) Remote Route Collectors (RRC) around the
globe. Prior to July of 2003, BGP messages were collected and stored at fifteenminute interval with the message sampling rate increased to every five minutes since
that date. [10][11]

Fig. 3. Data Collection and Parsing Steps

The collected BGP update messages are stored in multi-threaded routing toolkit
(MRT) format, which is described in RFC6396. The MRT formatted BGP update
messages are converted into ASCII format by slightly modifying a module found on
Github called mrtparse. This module is used as a part of the preprocessing steps as
follows. First, the RIS raw data is collected via web crawl script. The next stage
includes an iterative bash script to process all collected data files through mrtparse
module, and the parsed outputs collected in batches. Finally, concatenation of all the
message batches is performed in Python at which point the data is finally prepared for
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exploratory data analysis (EDA), feature engineering, etc. The BGP remote route
collector used for this project is RRC04 deployed at CERN Internet Exchange Point
(CIXP), Geneva, Switzerland. Dependent variable for supervised learning will be
based on known periods of Internet anomalies. [12] [13]
An example record of the parsed output is shown in Figure 4.

Fig. 4. Parsed MRT Record Example

4.1

Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)

The individual parsed messages as shown in Figure 3 are converted to long format,
filtered to only include BGP UPDATE messages which leads to the following output
fields.
For withdrawn routes, the pipe delimited fields are:
BGP protocol | timestamp | Withdraw or Announce | PeerIP | PeerAS | Prefix
For announcements, the pipe delimited fields are:
BGP protocol | timestamp | Withdraw or Announce | PeerIP | PeerAS | Prefix |
AS_PATH | Origin | Next_Hop | Local_Pref | MED | Community | AtomicAGG |
AGGREGATOR
Due to the massive size of the entire historical BGP dataset, sub-sampling was
incorporated by collecting five-day windows of data surrounding known historical
BGP event timestamps. The known event timestamps served as domain knowledge

Published by SMU Scholar, 2019
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indicator to determine if unsupervised anomaly detection was accurately detecting
events. Initial EDA ruled out supervised training for this use case due to the
requirement of inconsistent methods to apply dependent variable across multiple
events. However, supervised training could be applied after anomaly detection to
determine root cause (malicious, misconfiguration, outage, etc.), but that will not be
addressed in this project. Below is a sample of the events used as true positive metric
and their raw data size:
•
•
•
•
•
4.2

Nimda DoS Attack, 18 September 2001: 3,402,055 messages.
Slammer Worm, 25 January 2003: 2,351,501 messages.
TTNET BGP Misconfiguration, 24 December 2004: 434,671 messages.
Mosco Blackout Google, 7 May 2005: 1,646,471 messages.
TMnet BGP Misconfiguration, 12 June 2015: 19,982,317 messages.
Data Cleaning and Imputation

It was determined during EDA, that the parser output for the following fields were
unusable null values of all observations in raw data. These columns were removed:
| Next_Hop | Local_Pref | MED | Community | AtomicAGG | AGGREGATOR
This resulted in a filtered raw data set approximately 28 million processed records.

Fig. 5. Filtered Raw Data Sample
Table 3. Raw Data Dictionary

Column Name
PROTOCOL
RECORD
TIMESTAMP
TYPE

Description
Protocol of the message
Unique record ID
timestamp
UPDATE message type

PEERIP
PEERAS
PREFIX
AS_PATH

Peer IP address
Peer AS number
IP address prefix
sequence of AS path

https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol2/iss1/5
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BGP4MP
int
datetime
A: Announcement
W: Withdraw
STATE: No routing change
string
string
string
string of AS numbers separated
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ORIGIN

segments
Origin of the path
information

by space
IGP: NLRI is
interior to the originating AS
EGP: NLRI learned via the EGP
protocol
INCOMPLETE: NLRI learned by
some other means

Next, the AS_PATH column was used to extract a new column showing the length
of the AS path for that message. The remaining fields were then grouped by
timestamp in 15-minute bins to create feature statistics based on computations during
the time interval selected. NA values for these grouped bins were imputed to zero as
the NA value just indicted none were counted in that timespan.
Categorical features were expanded to include numeric counts by each class per
time window. Statistical features were derived from the AS length for each time
window. The resulting data frame for each 5-day event subsample is now pared down
to 480 rows with 11 features as shown below with feature descriptions in the
following section.

Fig. 6. Cleaned Data Output Columns Example

In addition to the grouped features above, max prefix duplicate counts and
grouping the messages by peer IP was added. This separate feature subset contains
over 7000 rows with 13 features as shown below.

Fig. 7. Grouped by IP Data Output Columns Example

Both the ‘group by IP’ and ‘group by all’ datasets were used for modeling to not
only compare models, but also to compare different approaches at feature
engineering.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2019
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4.3

Feature Engineering

The volume features are generated across each time interval as bulleted below with
some of the bullets highlighting multiple features based on different statistical
measures:
•

Count of announcements, withdrawals, and state message types over time.

Fig. 8. Count of Announcements (left) and Withdrawals (right) vs. Time

•

Count of messages originated from Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), Exterior
Gateway Protocol (EGP), and incomplete sources over time.

Fig. 9. Count of EGP (left), IGP (middle), and incomplete (right) vs. Time

•

Average, maximum, and standard deviation of AS PATH steps (number of
space delimited ASes in the AS PATH field) over time.

Fig. 10. AS Length Mean (left), Max (middle), SD(right) vs. Time

•

Maximum count of announcements and withdrawal of unique NLRI prefixes
during prescribed time interval.

https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol2/iss1/5
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Fig. 11. maximum NLRI Prefix value counts vs. Time

It is worth mentioning that some of these counts appear to correlate with event
occurrences and anomaly detection may be possible with just a high pass filter. To get
a fuller picture, however, will continue with cluster based unsupervised anomaly
detection [14].
4.4

Data Normalization

Data normalization is an important part of data preparation when we are dealing with
data features that have different ranges or units.
Considering the factors of internet traffic growth and span of sampled dates across
15 years, we need data normalization when comparing across these spans. Features
related to message counts need to be scaled among subsets to reduce the bias caused
by uneven data. Min-max scaling is applied for the normalization. (Figure 12: Total
massage count: before and after min-max scaling)
After min-max scaling, subsets are merged together. We use standardization on the
data to scale all features. A complete dataset is ready for analysis.
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Fig. 12. Total massage count: before and after min-max scaling

5

Anomaly Detection

Clustering based anomaly detection was utilized with known event timestamps to
compare models, tune parameters, and decide feature engineering. The clustering
models were unsupervised, but the known event timestamps help act as a domain
knowledge agent to determine if the anomaly detection was accurate or not for each
pass. This was attempted using K-means and DBSCAN clustering.
Silhouette Coefficient
Silhouette analysis is used in the model evaluation.
The silhouette coefficient is a combination of two distances:
a. The mean distance between point i to other points within the same cluster where
i is assigned.
b. The mean distance between point i to other points of the nearest cluster that i is
not a part of.

Silhouette coefficient shows how the points are close to the other points in the
same cluster and how the points are distance from other clusters.
The range of silhouette coefficient is from -1 to 1, 1 is the best result and -1 is the
worst. Score of 0 indicates overlapping clusters.
5.1

Unsupervised k-Means Clustering

The k-means clustering algorithm is widely used in many fields including anomaly
detection. It creates ‘k’ similar clusters of data points. Data instances that fall outside
of these groups could potentially be marked as anomalies. Before we start k-Means
clustering, we used elbow method to determine the optimal number of clusters.

https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol2/iss1/5
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Fig. 13. K-means Cluster Elbow Curve

Although the elbow curve shows marginal improvement after 9, we selected 14
clusters for this project based on trial and error related to false positive counts. The
underlying assumption in the clustering-based anomaly detection is that if we cluster
the data, normal data will belong to clusters while anomalies will not belong to any
clusters or belong to small clusters. We use the following steps to find and visualize
anomalies [15].
• Calculate the distance between each point and its nearest centroid. The biggest
distances are considered as anomaly.
•
Set up a scoring method to provide information to the algorithm about the
proportion of the outliers present in our data set.
• Calculate ‘number of outliers’ parameter using scoring method.
• Set threshold as the minimum distance of these outliers.
• The anomaly result will be a data field that contains the above method Cluster
(0:normal, 1:anomaly).

Published by SMU Scholar, 2019
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Fig. 14. Anomaly Detection Using k-Means Clustering

The results are a detection of 7 anomalies across 5 known event periods. The
anomalies are shown on the graph as the red dots and the graph encompasses 25 days
of normalized event activity. The silhouette score for this output was 0.652 and the
number of clusters used was 14. This is a very good result as each anomaly was
detected and the low number of actual anomalies listed shows an aversion to false
positives. The model and settings used here are also resilient to over-selecting
anomalies during ‘quiet times’, but still did predict a few false positives.
5.2

Unsupervised DBSCAN Clustering

DBSCAN, or density based spatial clustering of applications with noise, is a clustering
algorithm that finds core samples of high density and expands clusters from them. It is
good for data which contains clusters of similar density. Compared to centroid-based
clustering like k-Means, density-based clustering works by identifying “dense”
clusters of points, allowing it to learn clusters of arbitrary shape and identify outliers
in the data.[16]
• Two main parameters of DBSCAN need to be set and then thresholding
applied to their results to indicate anomalies:
o eps - The maximum distance between two data points to be
considered in the same neighborhood.
o min_samples - The number of samples (or total weight) in a
neighborhood for a point to be considered as a core point. [17]
o Set threshold as the proportion of noise points.
o Select eps and min_samples based on Silhouette scores and
proportion of noise points
• Data points labeled as noise points by DBSCAN are considered anomaly.

https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol2/iss1/5
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Fig. 15. Anomaly Detection Using DBSCAN Clustering

DBSCAN successfully detected anomalies during these event timelines. A total of
207 obeservations are detected as anomalies by DBSCAN with settings of eps = 3.5
and min_samples = 80. The Silhouette Coefficient is 0.836. DBSCAN is less resilient
to outliers than k-means during non-event times. [18]

6

Machine Learning Pipeline Proposal

Integrating machine learning models into big data pipeline would ultimately be the
goal of implementing a BGP anomaly trigger to make the insights actionable in nearreal time. Up to this point in the document, the steps in the cluster analysis engine
development on Figure 1 have been performed. The next steps to implement machine
learning pipeline as shown on the bottom of Figure 1 would be as follows. The
following steps are a proposal for future work in this domain. The assumption is a big
data architecture is in place. The high-level steps are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2019

Data is collected via job scheduler (cron, Oozie, etc.).
Script to create features (reproduce static feature creation output exactly)
is implemented (Python, Spark, Flink).
Features pushed to storage for future review/use (HDFS, etc.).
Script to apply model(s) (Python, Spark, Flink).
a. Also include revision control application to serialize the model
with versioning.
b. Chance to have feedback loop to parameterize model based on
latest results (future works).
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5.
6.

7

Publish anomalies (Kafka topic, HDFS, etc.).
Dashboard, Trigger (email, API to other system, etc.) each anomaly or
groups of anomalies (ELK stack, Splunk, etc.).

Ethics

This project is not deeply affected by ethics issues as the BGP message data used is
made available already for public use. If we had used private BGP syslog data, that
information may have had specific customer IP addresses that would have required
masking or concealing before statistical analysis. If using internal router logs, a
private company could correlate neighbor IP information with external data to create
many different BGP related triggers just based on correlations and high pass filters.
These could include but are not limited to single customer all circuits idle, single
router/card/interface all circuits idle, idle to established continuous flapping, etc. The
risk of reverse engineering the IP addresses from the masks may carry too much of a
negative to use this information outside of internal company systems.

8

Conclusions

The work covered in this paper has shown collection, parsing, feature engineering
of public BGP message data and developing statistical/temporal features to apply
unsupervised learning techniques. The most effective model for this iteration was kmeans with a silhouette score of .652 using 14 clusters. As an unsupervised learning
model, domain knowledge and inspection of the results determined this. False
positives remained too high with DBSCAN methods attempted.
Next steps can include implementing proposed machine learning pipeline to apply
the optimal model and parameters to near real-time data with an output to identify and
alert network operations center of probable BGP anomalies. Future work can focus on
several areas. Modeling improvements to reduce false positives can be implemented
via new data sources to correlate, different techniques such as supervised learning,
neural networks, hidden Markov model pattern comparisons, and new feature
engineering. Router syslogs with BGP session establishment messages could be a
huge boost in possible triggered alerts, even ones simply based on high pass filters as
the state machine for this process has several possible event outcomes even on
individual circuit basis.
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